collab-canvas
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
collab-canvas terminal writecommand enables the execution of arbitrary shell input within terminal tiles, which can be misused for unauthorized system commands. Evidence:collab-canvas terminal write <id> <input>inSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to modify user shell profiles (
~/.zshrcor~/.bashrc) to update the PATH, which constitutes a persistence mechanism. Evidence: "Setup" section instructions inSKILL.md. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
collab-canvas terminal readcommand allows an agent to read raw terminal buffers, creating a risk for the exposure of sensitive credentials or environment data. Evidence:collab-canvas terminal read <id> [--lines N]inSKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from terminal outputs and files. 1. Ingestion points:
collab-canvas terminal readandcollab-canvas tile create --fileinSKILL.md. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. 3. Capability inventory: Arbitrary shell execution viaterminal write. 4. Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not filter or validate external content before processing.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata