collab-canvas

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The collab-canvas terminal write command enables the execution of arbitrary shell input within terminal tiles, which can be misused for unauthorized system commands. Evidence: collab-canvas terminal write <id> <input> in SKILL.md.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to modify user shell profiles (~/.zshrc or ~/.bashrc) to update the PATH, which constitutes a persistence mechanism. Evidence: "Setup" section instructions in SKILL.md.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The collab-canvas terminal read command allows an agent to read raw terminal buffers, creating a risk for the exposure of sensitive credentials or environment data. Evidence: collab-canvas terminal read <id> [--lines N] in SKILL.md.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data from terminal outputs and files. 1. Ingestion points: collab-canvas terminal read and collab-canvas tile create --file in SKILL.md. 2. Boundary markers: Absent. 3. Capability inventory: Arbitrary shell execution via terminal write. 4. Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not filter or validate external content before processing.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 1, 2026, 11:04 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — collab-canvas