skills/sarthib7/agentsmith/handoff/Gen Agent Trust Hub

handoff

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface. It takes user-supplied arguments and conversation history—which could contain malicious instructions—and incorporates them into a handoff document designed to be read by another agent. This creates a multi-step chain where an attacker could influence subsequent agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: User arguments and conversation history mentioned in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to use delimiters or treat the summarized content as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to the file system.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any filtering or escaping of the ingested content.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of the mktemp shell utility to generate a temporary file path. While mktemp is a standard tool, the reliance on shell execution to determine file paths introduces a dependency on the underlying system's command environment.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to read the file path produced by mktemp before writing to it. While this may be intended as a check, reading arbitrary paths generated by external utilities can lead to unintentional data exposure if the path resolution is manipulated to point to sensitive files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 1, 2026, 11:05 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — handoff