handoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface. It takes user-supplied arguments and conversation history—which could contain malicious instructions—and incorporates them into a handoff document designed to be read by another agent. This creates a multi-step chain where an attacker could influence subsequent agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: User arguments and conversation history mentioned in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to use delimiters or treat the summarized content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to the file system.
- Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any filtering or escaping of the ingested content.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the execution of the
mktempshell utility to generate a temporary file path. Whilemktempis a standard tool, the reliance on shell execution to determine file paths introduces a dependency on the underlying system's command environment. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions explicitly direct the agent to read the file path produced by
mktempbefore writing to it. While this may be intended as a check, reading arbitrary paths generated by external utilities can lead to unintentional data exposure if the path resolution is manipulated to point to sensitive files.
Audit Metadata