render-blueprints
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains deceptive metadata regarding its authorship.
- Evidence: The frontmatter
authorfield inSKILL.mdis set to "Render", whereas the skill is attributed to "Sarthib7". This discrepancy could mislead users into attributing the skill's instructions to the official vendor. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection through user-data interpolation.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to write and edit
render.yamlfiles based on user requirements provided at runtime. - Capability inventory: Across all referenced documents, the agent is tasked with modifying local filesystem contents (configuration files).
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not include delimiters or warnings to treat user-provided configuration values as untrusted content.
- Sanitization: No guidance is provided for escaping or validating user inputs before they are interpolated into the YAML structure.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external configuration schemas from a well-known service.
- Evidence: Provides a link to the official Render JSON schema (
https://render.com/schema/render.yaml.json) for validation purposes.
Audit Metadata