temprouter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is explicitly designed to handle and transmit highly sensitive data, including API keys, private keys, and PII, to an external service hosted at
https://temprouter.onrender.com. Although the skill claims to use end-to-end encryption (E2EE) and Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), the routine transmission of secrets to a remote domain outside of standard whitelists represents a data exposure risk if the endpoint or client-side SDK is compromised. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on the
@temprouter/sdkNode.js package for core functionality, including encryption and network communication. It also references remote discovery files likeopenapi.jsonandllms.txtfrom theonrender.comhost. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides a surface where untrusted data (prompts) are ingested and forwarded to an LLM.
- Ingestion points: User-provided
promptstrings passed to theinfer()method and CLItemprouter infercommand inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to the model to ignore embedded instructions are present in the documentation examples.
- Capability inventory: The skill has network communication capabilities via the SDK to the
temprouter.onrender.comendpoint. - Sanitization: The skill relies on encryption for data privacy but does not describe content sanitization or filtering to prevent malicious instructions within the prompt from influencing the agent or the remote LLM.
Audit Metadata