touchdesigner
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection via the processing of untrusted TouchDesigner network data.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through tools like
td_operators,td_pane, andtd_selection, which inspect the state of the TouchDesigner network. Specifically, content fromDAToperators (e.g.,textDAT.text) is read and processed. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions within ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including arbitrary Python execution within the application via
td_executeand the ability to write files to the local system usingop.save(). - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is provided for external content before it is used to influence agent actions or code generation.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to dynamically generate Python scripts and GLSL shaders at runtime. These scripts are intended for execution within the TouchDesigner process using the
td_executeMCP tool. While this is the intended function of the developer tool, it represents a risk factor for executing logic derived from potentially untrusted inputs.
Audit Metadata