touchdesigner
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a Node.js client (
scripts/client.mjs) to manage a local knowledge base and send commands to TouchDesigner. This involves file system operations (read/write) in the user's home directory. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The Python extension
assets/toe/src/TouchDesignerAPI.pyprovides an HTTP endpoint (/execute) that uses the Pythonexec()function to run arbitrary code received from the agent. This allows for dynamic control of the TouchDesigner process but also creates a local execution sink. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a persistent 'Personal Knowledge Base' in
~/.touchdesigner-skill/knowledge/. The agent is instructed to store and retrieve lessons here, which involves accessing the local file system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads operator names, parameters, and network data from TouchDesigner projects. A maliciously crafted project could contain instructions within its metadata that the agent might inadvertently follow when processing project state.
- Ingestion points: Data retrieved via
pane,selection,operators,params,inspect, andnetworksubcommands inscripts/client.mjs. - Boundary markers: The client script provides SHA256 hashes and size diagnostics for input code, but metadata retrieved from TouchDesigner is not wrapped in safety delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary Python in the TouchDesigner process, perform local HTTP requests, and read/write to the local filesystem.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of operator names or parameter values retrieved from the TouchDesigner bridge before they are analyzed by the agent.
Audit Metadata