touchdesigner

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a Node.js client (scripts/client.mjs) to manage a local knowledge base and send commands to TouchDesigner. This involves file system operations (read/write) in the user's home directory.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The Python extension assets/toe/src/TouchDesignerAPI.py provides an HTTP endpoint (/execute) that uses the Python exec() function to run arbitrary code received from the agent. This allows for dynamic control of the TouchDesigner process but also creates a local execution sink.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill implements a persistent 'Personal Knowledge Base' in ~/.touchdesigner-skill/knowledge/. The agent is instructed to store and retrieve lessons here, which involves accessing the local file system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it reads operator names, parameters, and network data from TouchDesigner projects. A maliciously crafted project could contain instructions within its metadata that the agent might inadvertently follow when processing project state.
  • Ingestion points: Data retrieved via pane, selection, operators, params, inspect, and network subcommands in scripts/client.mjs.
  • Boundary markers: The client script provides SHA256 hashes and size diagnostics for input code, but metadata retrieved from TouchDesigner is not wrapped in safety delimiters.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute arbitrary Python in the TouchDesigner process, perform local HTTP requests, and read/write to the local filesystem.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of operator names or parameter values retrieved from the TouchDesigner bridge before they are analyzed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 19, 2026, 02:11 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — touchdesigner