session-recovery
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the
session_storedatabase which can lead to indirect prompt injection attacks. - Ingestion points: Reads conversation history from the
turnstable in the SQLite database (identified in SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified. The instructions do not define delimiters or provide guidance to ignore instructions embedded within retrieved session turns.
- Capability inventory: Uses the
sqltool to query databases and thecopilotCLI tool to resume execution environments. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is applied to the retrieved
user_messageorsummaryfields before they are presented to the agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands to resume sessions and list repository data.
- Evidence: Execution of
copilot --resume SESSION_IDandgh issue listbased on data retrieved from the database.
Audit Metadata