validate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interpolates the
$ARGUMENTSvariable directly into a Bash shell command inSKILL.mdwithout proper quoting. This pattern is susceptible to shell injection, where a user can execute arbitrary commands by including shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&&,|) in the input arguments. - Evidence: Found in
SKILL.mdwithin theuv runand fallbackpython3command lines:uv run "${CLAUDE_SKILL_DIR}/scripts/okf_validate.py" $ARGUMENTS. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's fallback execution path installs the
pyyamllibrary from the Python Package Index (PyPI) at runtime. - Evidence:
python3 -m pip install --quiet pyyamlinSKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted Markdown content from a user-specified directory, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in the data could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/okf_validate.pyrecursively reads and parses all.mdfiles within the provided bundle directory. - Boundary markers: No markers or explicit instructions are provided to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the bundle files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
Bashtool, which is used to execute the Python validator and manage dependencies. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the Markdown content or frontmatter before the script processes it and outputs findings.
Audit Metadata