scenario-blender
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill exposes an
execute_python(code)tool that allows for arbitrary Python code execution within the Blender environment. - Evidence: The 'Quick reference' section defines
execute_python(code)and notes it is 'Off until the user enables Allow connected agents to run Python' in the Scenario preferences. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes capabilities to read local files and send data to external services.
- Evidence: The
upload_reference(path, kind)tool accesses file paths, though it is described as restricted to user-chosen files. Tools likecapture_referenceandgenerateinteract with the remote Scenario API for asset processing. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references external sources for extension installation and updates.
- Evidence: Mentions
https://blender.scenario.com/repo/index.jsonandhttps://github.com/scenario-labs/blender-pluginfor extension setup. These are vendor-owned resources. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes complex scene data and external job statuses which could potentially contain malicious instructions if the source data is compromised.
- Ingestion points: Scene data via
scene_summary, job metadata viajob_status, and result applications inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the provided instructions.
- Capability inventory: Arbitrary Python execution (
execute_python), file reading (upload_reference), and scene modification tools found inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or validation logic is described for data returned from the MCP server or Blender API.
Audit Metadata