scenario-maya-groom
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/mx_groom.pymakes extensive use ofeval()andexec()to interface with Autodesk Maya's internal scripting engine (MEL). In the_menu_buildfunction, the skill executes code strings retrieved directly from the software's UI metadata viacmds.menuItem(path, q=True, postMenuCommand=True). Additionally, therun_recipefunction retrieves MEL code templates from a local JSON file (mx_groom_recipes.json), fills them with arguments, and executes them. This dynamic code generation and execution poses a security risk if the UI metadata or the local JSON recipes are manipulated by an attacker. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data formats, specifically Alembic (
.abc) geometry files, through functions such asinspect_abcandmeasure_abc. These files are imported into the active Maya session, and their internal metadata (node names, attributes, and curve counts) is used to generate reports and influence the agent's logic (e.g., triggering theunreal_verdictgate). A maliciously crafted Alembic file could provide unexpected input to the agent's decision-making process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
maya.mel.evalthroughoutscripts/mx_groom.pyto run shell-like commands within the Maya environment, including file operations, render overrides, and UI manipulations. While standard for Maya automation, this capability increases the impact of any potential injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]:
SKILL.mdcontains instructions for the agent to prompt the user to install additional skills usingnpx skills add scenario-labs/skills. Although this points to the author's own ecosystem, it provides a vector for the agent to introduce new, external code into its execution environment.
Audit Metadata