scenario-seedream
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill handles untrusted external data in the form of user-provided text prompts and reference images. This data is passed to external image generation and editing models, creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in the input to influence the agent's actions.
- Ingestion points:
prompt,referenceImages, andimageparameters used in themodel_runtool as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to disregard embedded commands are mentioned in the documentation for these inputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes tools for network API requests (
model_run) and file system writes (asset_download). - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the processed inputs is described.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation instructs the agent to ask users to install additional components from the author's official repository.
- Evidence: The text recommends using
npx skills add scenario-labs/skillsto obtain missing sibling skills. - Context: These references target the official resources of the skill's author (
scenario-labs) and are standard for the tool's ecosystem. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill suggests a method for verifying image transparency using a Python command that dynamically loads a library.
- Evidence: Recommendation to use
uv run --with pillowto check the alpha channel of generated images. - Context: This is a diagnostic step using well-known development tools (
uv,pillow) for functional verification.
Audit Metadata