scenario-video-color-grade
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality relies on executing
ffmpegandffprobevia thesubprocessmodule. These calls are essential for the primary purpose of video color grading and rendering. Evidence of this pattern is found across several files:scripts/media.py(probing and encoding),scripts/match.py(cropping reference images),scripts/render_looks.py(applying LUTs), andscripts/showreel.py(assembling the final reel). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exposes an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted data and interpolating it into shell commands. 1. Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context through
looks.jsonconfiguration files (e.g., inscripts/render_looks.py) and command-line arguments like--crop(inscripts/match.py). 2. Boundary markers: There are no specific delimiters or safety instructions used to separate the interpolated data from theffmpegfilter graph syntax. 3. Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to run arbitraryffmpegfilter chains viasubprocess.runandsubprocess.Popeninscripts/render_looks.pyandscripts/media.py. 4. Sanitization: While arguments are passed to thesubprocessmodule as lists (preventing direct shell injection), the internal syntax offfmpegfilter strings remains susceptible to manipulation if parameters contain filter-chain delimiters like commas or semicolons.
Audit Metadata