scenario-zbrush-stylized
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/zb_stylized.pyusesimportlib.import_moduleto dynamically load sibling modules (zb_audit,zb_review,zb_launch) from a relative vendor path. It also contains abuild_callfunction that generates Python code as strings to be executed within the ZBrush environment via a bridge interface. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources, specifically OBJ mesh files and PNG canvas renders. The
Surface.from_objandsilhouette_maskfunctions inscripts/zb_stylized.pyprocess these files to derive geometric properties. This represents an attack surface where maliciously crafted geometry or image metadata could potentially influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points:
scripts/zb_stylized.py(OBJ and PNG files) - Boundary markers: Absent
- Capability inventory: File writes, ZBrush command execution, and local network communication
- Sanitization: Absent
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a socket-based bridge (port 7788) to send and execute sculpting commands, UI interactions, and mesh operations inside the ZBrush application process.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions for the agent to ask the user to add sibling skills usingnpxfrom the vendor's official repositoryscenario-labs/skills.
Audit Metadata