codex
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a pre-installed external CLI tool named
codex. This is not a standard or officially recognized tool from OpenAI, and its behavior cannot be verified. Executing unverified third-party binaries is a high-risk activity that can lead to system compromise. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill's description and instructions reference non-existent models such as 'GPT-5.4' and 'gpt-5.3-codex'. These deceptive claims may be intended to trick the agent or user into trusting the tool's capabilities and safety.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The instructions encourage the use of the
--full-autoflag, which enables 'auto-approval of file writes.' This bypasses standard user intervention and approval workflows for file system modifications. Furthermore, the skill mentions a--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag, which, although advised against, indicates the tool possesses capabilities to completely escape security constraints. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The workflow directs the agent to run
codex execto generate implementation code and then immediately 'Run tests/linting to validate quality.' This sequence results in the execution of code generated by an untrusted external tool, providing a direct mechanism for arbitrary code execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly vulnerable to indirect injection as it ingests project files and user prompts without sanitization or boundary markers. These inputs are passed to a tool with file-write and execution capabilities, creating a significant attack surface where malicious data could trigger dangerous agent behaviors.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata