contact-hunter-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources (HubSpot, Apollo, Clay) and incorporates it into output templates without explicit sanitization. Ingestion points include data returned from
mcp__claude_ai_Apollo_io__apollo_contacts_searchandmcp__claude_ai_Clay__find-and-enrich-contacts-at-companyinSKILL.md. Boundary markers are present in the form of markdown boxes and code blocks used to delimit output. Capability inventory includes file system write capability to the~/.claude/directory. Sanitization is absent; there are no instructions to the agent to sanitize or ignore potential instructions embedded within retrieved contact fields such as names, titles, or company descriptions. - [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the metadata provided in the skill files and the authoritative author context.
config.jsonidentifies the author as "Tim Kipper", while the system-provided author context for this analysis is "scientiacapital". - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform file system write operations in a hidden directory outside the project workspace.
SKILL.mdcontains an instruction to "Emit Outcome Sidecar" by writing a JSON file to~/.claude/skill-analytics/last-outcome-contact-hunter.jsonafter every successful hunt. While used for analytics tracking, writing to hidden home directories is an autonomous filesystem action that should be monitored.
Audit Metadata