contact-hunter-skill

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources (HubSpot, Apollo, Clay) and incorporates it into output templates without explicit sanitization. Ingestion points include data returned from mcp__claude_ai_Apollo_io__apollo_contacts_search and mcp__claude_ai_Clay__find-and-enrich-contacts-at-company in SKILL.md. Boundary markers are present in the form of markdown boxes and code blocks used to delimit output. Capability inventory includes file system write capability to the ~/.claude/ directory. Sanitization is absent; there are no instructions to the agent to sanitize or ignore potential instructions embedded within retrieved contact fields such as names, titles, or company descriptions.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the metadata provided in the skill files and the authoritative author context. config.json identifies the author as "Tim Kipper", while the system-provided author context for this analysis is "scientiacapital".
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform file system write operations in a hidden directory outside the project workspace. SKILL.md contains an instruction to "Emit Outcome Sidecar" by writing a JSON file to ~/.claude/skill-analytics/last-outcome-contact-hunter.json after every successful hunt. While used for analytics tracking, writing to hidden home directories is an autonomous filesystem action that should be monitored.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 09:52 PM