linkedin-social-selling-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, including LinkedIn posts and community signals via
common-room, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Digital intent signals from
common-room, prospect data fromzoominfoandapollo, and content from a buyer's recent LinkedIn posts. - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly use delimiters or instruction-ignore warnings when interpolating external content into prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill invokes several tools (Epiphan AI, Brand MCP) and performs file write operations to the local filesystem for analytics.
- Sanitization: While the skill uses
check_my_copyfor brand consistency, there is no evidence of security-specific sanitization or escaping of external data to prevent prompt injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates multiple external plugins and MCP tools, including
common-room,zoominfo,apollo, andEpiphan AI, to perform research and draft generation. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill writes session outcomes and analytics data to absolute paths in the user's home directory (
~/.claude/skill-analytics/and~/.claude/skill-runs/). While these are intended for internal tracking, automated writes to these locations should be monitored.
Audit Metadata