meeting-intelligence-system-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted meeting transcripts, notes, and recordings which could contain malicious instructions designed to override the agent's behavior during analysis.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted meeting transcripts, notes, and recordings provided by the user (as described in SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of boundary markers or delimiters to isolate the transcript content from the analysis instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local filesystem (telemetry log).
- Sanitization: There are no instructions to sanitize or validate the content of the transcripts before processing them.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to perform a file-write operation to a specific local path to log session metadata.
- Evidence: The 'Emit Outcome Sidecar' section in SKILL.md directs the agent to write a JSON block to
~/.claude/skill-analytics/last-outcome-meeting-intelligence-system.json.
Audit Metadata