post-demo-automation-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external content from call transcripts and CRM notes to generate customer-facing drafts and internal logs.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested via
clari_get_call_summary(recording summaries, objections) andhubspot_get_dealinSKILL.md(Stage 1). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or 'ignore' instructions for the Clari-sourced summaries before they are used to populate drafts.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to
create_draftin Gmail,create_eventin Google Calendar, and write notes/tasks in HubSpot (hubspot_create_contact_note,hubspot_create_contact_task). - Sanitization: The skill mandates a 'Gate B' check using the
check_my_copytool on every customer-facing string before a draft is created, providing a layer of validation against malicious content. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads from and writes to specific hidden directories in the user's home folder for configuration and logging.
- Evidence: The skill references paths such as
~/.claude/skills/epiphan-house-rules-skill/for rules and writes analytics to~/.claude/skill-analytics/and~/.claude/skill-runs/. - Context: While these appear to be standard paths for agent execution logging and cross-skill coordination within this specific environment, arbitrary file system writes represent a potential surface for persistence or data leakage if misconfigured.
Audit Metadata