prospect-enrich-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external sources including HubSpot contact records, Apollo match results, and Clay enrichment data.
- Ingestion points: Contact data is pulled via
execute_sqlin Stage 1, while enrichment data enters the context in Stages 4 and 5. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands when processing or reporting the external contact strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to execute SQL queries, write back to the HubSpot CRM, send Slack messages, and write files to the local skill-state directory.
- Sanitization: The instructions do not specify sanitization for lead-provided strings (such as job titles or names) before they are interpolated into reports or Slack notifications.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Uses the
execute_sqltool to query the HubSpot CRM database. - The SQL logic is hardcoded within the skill workflow rather than being dynamically generated from user input, which limits the risk of SQL injection attacks.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Transfers HubSpot PII, including names and email addresses, to external services for enrichment.
- This behavior is the primary functional purpose of the skill and uses well-known technology services (Apollo and Clay).
- The data transfer is restricted to the specific lead fields required for enrichment.
Audit Metadata