runpod-deployment

Warn

Audited by Socket on Sep 17, 2026

4 alerts found:

Anomalyx3Security
AnomalyLOW
reference/model-deployment.md

No direct malware or covert data-exfiltration behavior is evident. The main security risks are execution of unreviewed remote model code through trust_remote_code=True, insecure handling of HF_TOKEN in Docker build arguments and environment declarations, configurable prompt forwarding to TGI_URL, and insufficient input/resource limits. These are significant deployment security concerns but do not establish that the supplied documentation contains malware.

Confidence: 97%Severity: 62%
AnomalyLOW
templates/runpod-worker.py

The fragment is an inference-serving worker with no direct evidence of malware or deliberate data exfiltration. The main security concern is trust_remote_code=True combined with configurable MODEL_NAME, which permits arbitrary code from a selected or compromised Hugging Face repository to execute during startup. Returning full tracebacks is an additional information disclosure issue. The package should restrict trusted model repositories, pin and verify model revisions, avoid remote custom code where possible, and suppress detailed tracebacks in production responses.

Confidence: 96%Severity: 68%
AnomalyLOW
reference/cicd.md

The fragment documents legitimate CI/CD and RunPod deployment behavior and provides no direct evidence of malware, credential theft, exfiltration, or sabotage. The principal security concerns are unverified mutable binary downloads executed with sudo, unpinned npx execution of an MCP package with access to RUNPOD_API_KEY, and automatic deployment on main. Pin versions, verify checksums or signatures, pin the npm package version, restrict workflow permissions, use immutable image tags, and protect the deployment branch and secrets.

Confidence: 97%Severity: 57%
SecurityMEDIUM
reference/templates.md

The fragment contains legitimate RunPod deployment templates and no clear malicious payload or intentional data theft. It presents meaningful supply-chain and credential-exposure risks: HF_TOKEN is passed through Docker build arguments, runpodctl is fetched and executed without integrity verification, and dependencies/MCP execution are insufficiently pinned. These are security hardening concerns with potentially high impact in CI or cloud environments, but the code itself does not provide strong evidence of malware.

Confidence: 97%Severity: 72%
Audit Metadata
Analyzed At
Sep 17, 2026, 09:59 AM
Package URL
pkg:socket/skills-sh/scientiacapital%2Fskills%2Frunpod-deployment%2F@7522f83fe7e84d717fae7a0e090393b777b2fd68030c5f6f76a7d4f8d2736f98
Security Audit — socket — runpod-deployment