voice-ai-skill

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's documentation in reference/latency-optimization.md provides implementation patterns for recording conversation content (content) and performance metrics to an external Supabase database. This creates a data exfiltration path where potentially sensitive spoken interactions are transmitted to a third-party service.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The SKILL.md file contains instructions for the agent to write outcome analytics to ~/.claude/skill-analytics/last-outcome-voice-ai-skill.json. This is a persistent file write operation targeting the user's home directory, which remains outside the immediate project workspace.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted audio data via Deepgram transcription, which is then converted to text and interpolated into LLM prompts in reference/groq-voice-llm.md and templates/voice-agent-starter.py.
  • Ingestion points: Transcribed user_text is passed into the conversation history and subsequent LLM calls.
  • Boundary markers: While reference/voice-prompts.md suggests using tags like --- USER CONTEXT ---, the core implementation in templates/voice-agent-starter.py simply appends messages to a list, lacking robust boundary enforcement.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has extensive network capabilities (Groq, Deepgram, Cartesia, Twilio, Supabase) and file system access (writing analytics).
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of transcribed text is performed before it is used to influence the agent's behavior in the next turn.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 09:52 PM