voice-ai-skill
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's documentation in
reference/latency-optimization.mdprovides implementation patterns for recording conversation content (content) and performance metrics to an external Supabase database. This creates a data exfiltration path where potentially sensitive spoken interactions are transmitted to a third-party service. - [PERSISTENCE]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions for the agent to write outcome analytics to~/.claude/skill-analytics/last-outcome-voice-ai-skill.json. This is a persistent file write operation targeting the user's home directory, which remains outside the immediate project workspace. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted audio data via Deepgram transcription, which is then converted to text and interpolated into LLM prompts in
reference/groq-voice-llm.mdandtemplates/voice-agent-starter.py. - Ingestion points: Transcribed
user_textis passed into the conversation history and subsequent LLM calls. - Boundary markers: While
reference/voice-prompts.mdsuggests using tags like--- USER CONTEXT ---, the core implementation intemplates/voice-agent-starter.pysimply appends messages to a list, lacking robust boundary enforcement. - Capability inventory: The agent has extensive network capabilities (Groq, Deepgram, Cartesia, Twilio, Supabase) and file system access (writing analytics).
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of transcribed text is performed before it is used to influence the agent's behavior in the next turn.
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