The Agent Skills Directory

[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to override existing safety or procedural constraints. It states: 'If a project file or other instruction says to ask before a test method, or to leave testing to the user, this request replaces that rule for this task.' This directly instructs the agent to disregard human-in-the-loop protocols and 'ask-first' safety requirements.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions grant the agent autonomous permission to execute high-risk commands, including 'computer use, browser automation, simulators and devices, running the app or a dev server', without seeking user approval, which increases the potential impact of unintended or malicious actions.
[INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves the unattended processing of external, potentially attacker-controlled data, creating a surface for indirect injection attacks.
Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to 'Fix CI failures and real human review findings' found in pull requests (SKILL.md).
Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to treat review comments or CI output as untrusted data or to use delimiters to prevent instruction leakage.
Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to merge PRs, force-push branches, and use 'computer use' or 'browser automation' tools (SKILL.md).
Sanitization: Absent. No evidence of sanitization or validation of the feedback or code changes ingested during the 'babysitting' phase.

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