tracer-implement
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from 'requests, tickets, or specs' to define implementation tasks, creating an attack surface where malicious input could influence agent behavior.\n
- Ingestion points: The goal and acceptance requirements are derived from external sources in SKILL.md (Step 2) and recorded in plan.md.\n
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for external content in the implementer-prompt.md or fixer-prompt.md templates.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to write files, execute Git operations via scripts (scripts/review-package, scripts/workspace), and run shell commands for testing as defined in SKILL.md.\n
- Sanitization: No evidence of input validation or content sanitization is present for the ingested ticket data.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The implementation workflow (Step 3 in SKILL.md) requires the agent to 'self-check changed behavior' by running 'focused red/green tests'. This involves the dynamic execution of code or scripts generated by the agent during the session to verify its changes.
Audit Metadata