studio-setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The diagnostic script
scripts/doctor.pyreads configuration data from sensitive file paths, specifically.envin the current working directory and~/.config/video-studio/.envto identify the presence of API keys. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill documentation encourages downloading and executing code from external sources. This includes installing a package via a GitHub archive URL (
https://github.com/scrollmark/social-skills/archive/refs/heads/master.tar.gz) and installing theuvtool using a remote shell script (https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/doctor.pyto execute shell commands for verifying the status and capabilities of local binaries likeffmpegand thevideo-studioCLI. It also provides instructions for the agent to execute system-level setup commands. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill describes a
video-studio setup --yescommand that is capable of performing 'system' level changes, such as using a package manager to install tools likeffmpegornodeoutside of the project directory. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from multiple external generative services and stock archives, creating a surface for potential injection from untrusted API responses.
- Ingestion points: Environment variables loaded by
doctor.py, and outputs from various generative and stock API providers. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define explicit delimiters or warnings for handling external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands and trigger system-wide software installations.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation logic for data retrieved from external service providers.
Audit Metadata