video-production
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the installation of the
video-studio-enginepackage directly from a GitHub repository archive and utilizes the@scrollmark/clitool. These external resources are managed through standard package managers (pip and npx) and are hosted within the official ecosystem of the skill's author. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple bundled Python utility scripts (
doctor.py,normalize_audio.py,poster.py, andqc_render.py) utilize thesubprocessmodule to execute system commands. These operations are strictly directed at media processing utilities likeffmpegandffprobe, or the project's ownvideo-studiocommand-line interface, to perform tasks such as audio normalization, frame extraction, and render validation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's workflow involves ingesting and processing data from external and potentially untrusted sources, including user-provided URLs, local files, and generated media prompts. This ingestion creates a theoretical surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in media metadata or source content.
- Ingestion points: Step 3 of the pipeline acquires footage and audio from diverse sources including
url:andfile:paths defined in the storyboard. - Boundary markers: The engine uses a structured JSON schema for storyboards and plans to isolate instructions from data, and requires explicit user approval before installations or major pipeline steps.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for file system writes to project directories, shell command execution for media processing, and network access for asset sourcing.
- Sanitization: Validation is primarily handled by the underlying
video-studioengine andffmpegfilters, supplemented by mandatory human-in-the-loop review phases (Step 8) for quality control.
Audit Metadata