codex-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from the repository, including code diffs and file contents, through
git diffandcatcommands. This data is interpolated into prompts for the AI reviewer, creating a vulnerability surface where malicious code could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Files and diffs are read from the local repository as specified in
references/codex-research-instructions.mdandSKILL.mdStep 1. - Boundary markers: Prompt templates in the
references/directory use Markdown headers (e.g.,## Changed Files,## Diff Stats) to separate instructions from untrusted code data. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash(git, node, and project scripts),Task(subagent invocation), andMCP Codex(read-only filesystem access). - Sanitization: The skill relies on prompt-level instructions for the AI to 'Deliberate' and perform 'Evidence checks' and 'False positive checks' rather than programmatically sanitizing the code inputs.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of several local project scripts (
scripts/resolve-feature.sh,scripts/lib/review-dispatch.js,scripts/validate-family-sentinel.js, andscripts/review-state.js) usingbashandnode. The skill configuration grants broadBash(bash:*)permissions, which the documentation acknowledges as 'broader than ideal'. Although targeted at project scripts, this permission level allows the execution of any bash command if the logic is compromised.
Audit Metadata