feasibility-study
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external design documents and user-provided topic inputs during requirement decomposition, creating an inherent exposure to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Processes files from the repository identified via
design_recordsand user input withinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; no explicit delimiters or specific defensive isolation prompts are defined for treating the contents of the parsed design records.
- Capability inventory: Full file reading (
Read), text matching (Grep), arbitrary bash shell execution (Bash(bash:*)), and subagent dispatch (Agent). - Sanitization: Absent; no verification or input filtering is implemented before feeding the contents into the primary agent or subagent prompts.
Audit Metadata