literature-search
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill interpolates user input directly into the top-level prompt without protection.
- Evidence: The line
Search for relevant papers on: $ARGUMENTSlacks delimiters (such as triple quotes or XML tags) to prevent user-supplied topics from containing instructions that could override the skill's logic. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill extracts and summarizes content from local files that could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: The process reads
.bibfiles from~/code,~/paperpile-bib, and the project root, including fields like abstracts and titles. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are used when the agent processes the extracted text.
- Capability inventory: The agent uses its internal reasoning to summarize top papers and identify gaps, creating an opportunity for embedded instructions in paper abstracts to influence agent behavior.
- Sanitization: There is no logic to sanitize or escape data read from the local bibliography files before the agent analyzes it.
Audit Metadata