org-orchestrate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill implements automated scheduling and persistence mechanisms to maintain long-term execution.
- Evidence:
- Modifies the user's crontab using
crontab -landcrontab -eequivalents to install periodic jobs. - Creates and loads macOS
launchdconfiguration files (plist) in~/Library/LaunchAgents/to ensure automation survives system reboots. - Uses
launchctl loadto activate these persistence agents. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Extensive use of shell commands to manage system state and external resources.
- Evidence:
- Executes GitHub CLI commands (
gh repo list,gh repo clone) to manage external source code. - Runs local shell scripts (e.g.,
git-pull-all.sh,cron-bot-tasks.sh) and template managers. - Interacts with system services via
launchctlandcrontab. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to prompt the user for permission to bypass security guardrails.
- Evidence:
- Asks the user if they wish to use the
--dangerously-skip-permissionsflag for unattended runs, which removes human-in-the-loop oversight for sensitive operations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for processing untrusted data with significant system capabilities.
- Evidence:
- Ingestion points: Reads
CLAUDE.mdfiles from local repositories and fetches repository metadata (names, descriptions) from GitHub. - Boundary markers: No specific boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands in processed files are present.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, write to the filesystem, modify system persistence settings, and trigger other skills.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of data retrieved from external repositories or local configuration files was found.
Audit Metadata