ci-cd-and-automation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a workflow where the agent is instructed to ingest and process CI/CD failure logs to diagnose and fix errors. If an attacker can influence the build output (e.g., through a malicious pull request), they could potentially embed instructions in the logs to redirect the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Section 'Feeding CI Failures Back to Agents' in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the example prompt lacks delimiters to distinguish the pasted error logs from instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution via npm, npx, and Vercel tools, and references the 'incremental-implementation' skill for code modifications.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested log content is mentioned.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: Several inconsistencies are present in the skill's metadata.
  • Author Discrepancy: The YAML frontmatter lists 'addyosmani' as the author, which contradicts the provided author context of 'seaworld008'.
  • Future Dating: The 'created_at' and 'updated_at' fields use dates in 2026, which is inconsistent with current system time.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing various development and deployment tools via the shell.
  • Evidence: Usage of npm ci, npm run lint, npx tsc, npm test, npx playwright, and npx vercel is documented throughout the SKILL.md templates.
  • [SAFE_PRACTICE]: The skill follows security best practices for secret management, explicitly advising against hardcoding credentials and recommending the use of GitHub Secrets or dedicated vaults.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 18, 2026, 12:45 PM