jupyter-notebook
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts user-provided notebook titles that are subsequently interpolated into markdown cells within the generated
.ipynbfile. This represents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if the resulting notebook is later processed by an AI agent. - Ingestion points: The
--titleparameter inscripts/new_notebook.pyreceives untrusted input from the user. - Boundary markers: While the content is structured as JSON, there are no specific prompt instructions or delimiters used to ensure the agent ignores potentially malicious instructions embedded in the title string.
- Capability inventory: The bundled script
scripts/new_notebook.pyhas the capability to create directories and write files to the local file system usingpathlibandjsonmodules. - Sanitization: The skill includes a
slugifyfunction to sanitize filenames (enforcing alphanumeric characters and hyphens), but the title itself is not sanitized before being placed into the markdown cell content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow requires the execution of shell commands, specifically using
uv runto invoke the bundled scaffolding script anduv pip installfor managing notebook dependencies. These operations are essential for the skill's primary purpose and are performed on the local system.
Audit Metadata