lark-event
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to consume and process data from external, attacker-controllable sources such as Lark/Feishu chat messages, meeting notes, task descriptions, and whiteboard updates.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the
lark-cli event consumecommand across various event domains (IM, Minutes, Task, VC, Board), as described inSKILL.mdand the domain-specific reference files. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of boundary markers or delimiters to isolate untrusted event content from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes subprocess execution to run
lark-cliandjqfor event processing, providing a capability surface that could be targeted by instructions embedded in the event data. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external content to remove potentially malicious instructions before the agent processes the data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands via the
lark-clibinary to interact with the Lark platform. While this is the intended functionality, it establishes a execution environment that must be carefully managed when processing the untrusted data ingestion described above.
Audit Metadata