lark-sheets

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external Lark/Feishu spreadsheets which are untrusted sources. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in cells could influence the agent's behavior during data analysis or processing.
  • Ingestion points: Data is read via the lark-cli tool as coordinated in scripts/lark_sheet_read_cli.py and processed in scripts/lark_profile_table.py and scripts/lark_detect_subtables.py.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses annotated_csv with [row=N] prefixes to help the agent distinguish between data and structure, and provides extensive documentation on correctly identifying data ranges to prevent interpretation of empty or footer rows as data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including executing shell commands via subprocess.run (in scripts/lark_sheet_read_cli.py), writing to the file system (via +workbook-export), and making extensive modifications to external spreadsheets.
  • Sanitization: The skill includes logic in scripts/lark_detect_subtables.py to handle malformed CSV quoting, providing some resilience against data parsing errors.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper scripts in the scripts/ directory use subprocess.run to invoke the lark-cli binary. Although the implementation correctly avoids using shell=True, it constructs and executes commands based on arguments that are derived from the agent's interaction context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 8, 2026, 06:56 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — lark-sheets