lark-sheets
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external Lark/Feishu spreadsheets which are untrusted sources. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in cells could influence the agent's behavior during data analysis or processing.
- Ingestion points: Data is read via the
lark-clitool as coordinated inscripts/lark_sheet_read_cli.pyand processed inscripts/lark_profile_table.pyandscripts/lark_detect_subtables.py. - Boundary markers: The skill uses
annotated_csvwith[row=N]prefixes to help the agent distinguish between data and structure, and provides extensive documentation on correctly identifying data ranges to prevent interpretation of empty or footer rows as data. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities including executing shell commands via
subprocess.run(inscripts/lark_sheet_read_cli.py), writing to the file system (via+workbook-export), and making extensive modifications to external spreadsheets. - Sanitization: The skill includes logic in
scripts/lark_detect_subtables.pyto handle malformed CSV quoting, providing some resilience against data parsing errors. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The helper scripts in the
scripts/directory usesubprocess.runto invoke thelark-clibinary. Although the implementation correctly avoids usingshell=True, it constructs and executes commands based on arguments that are derived from the agent's interaction context.
Audit Metadata