lark-slides

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes Python test scripts (scripts/iconpark_tool_test.py and scripts/xml_lint_test.py) that use subprocess.run to execute CLI commands. These are utilized solely for internal testing and validation of the skill's own tooling.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs dynamic execution for compatibility and testing infrastructure.
  • scripts/xml_text_overlap_lint_test.py uses os.execv to perform process replacement, acting as a compatibility wrapper to execute the xml_lint_test.py script.
  • scripts/xml_lint_test.py contains a compile() call, which is used for internal evaluation of test logic or XML fragments during validation suites.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's workflow involves reading and editing existing slide content, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if those slides contain adversarial instructions.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the outputs of lark-cli slides +xml-get and xml_presentation.slide.get as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: While data is processed as structured XML, there are no specific markers or instructions to the model to ignore natural language commands embedded within slide text elements.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via the lark-cli binary and perform local file system writes for XML drafts and screenshots.
  • Sanitization: All generated or modified content is passed through an automated layout and schema validator (scripts/xml_lint.py) which ensures structural integrity and visual compliance.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 8, 2026, 06:56 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — lark-slides