lark-slides
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes Python test scripts (
scripts/iconpark_tool_test.pyandscripts/xml_lint_test.py) that usesubprocess.runto execute CLI commands. These are utilized solely for internal testing and validation of the skill's own tooling. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs dynamic execution for compatibility and testing infrastructure.
scripts/xml_text_overlap_lint_test.pyusesos.execvto perform process replacement, acting as a compatibility wrapper to execute thexml_lint_test.pyscript.scripts/xml_lint_test.pycontains acompile()call, which is used for internal evaluation of test logic or XML fragments during validation suites.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's workflow involves reading and editing existing slide content, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if those slides contain adversarial instructions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the outputs of
lark-cli slides +xml-getandxml_presentation.slide.getas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: While data is processed as structured XML, there are no specific markers or instructions to the model to ignore natural language commands embedded within slide text elements.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via the
lark-clibinary and perform local file system writes for XML drafts and screenshots. - Sanitization: All generated or modified content is passed through an automated layout and schema validator (
scripts/xml_lint.py) which ensures structural integrity and visual compliance.
Audit Metadata