lark-whiteboard
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions explicitly telling the agent to run tools such aslark-cliandnpxwithout asking the user ('无需询问用户'). This is a pattern used to bypass standard user confirmation protocols for tool execution. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Multiple scene files (e.g.,
scenes/fishbone.md,scenes/bar-chart.md,scenes/flywheel.md,scenes/funnel.md,scenes/pyramid.md,scenes/treemap.md) instruct the agent to generate a JavaScript file (diagram.gen.cjs) containing logic and user-provided data, and then execute it using thenodecommand. This pattern of generating and executing local scripts is a high-risk dynamic execution vector. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting untrusted user data and interpolating it into executable scripts.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied diagram content (labels, values, titles) processed in
scenes/templates. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used to isolate user data within the generated scripts.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute
nodeon generated files and uselark-clito perform network operations (Lark API updates). - Sanitization: The provided JavaScript templates use direct string interpolation for user-controlled values without visible sanitization or escaping logic.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill workflow frequently invokes
npx -y @larksuite/whiteboard-cli@^0.2.13to download and execute code from the Lark Suite official NPM organization. While the source is a well-known vendor, the practice of automated external code execution is documented here as part of the tool's operation.
Audit Metadata