Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of a third-party NPM package
@linkedapi/linkedin-cli. This introduces a dependency on external code from a source that is not listed in the recognized trusted organizations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality is built around shell commands that interact with the LinkedIn automation CLI, covering operations from data retrieval to account actions.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
setupinstructions prompt the user to provide API and identification tokens as plain-text command-line arguments. This practice can expose sensitive credentials in shell logs, command history, or process monitoring tools. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
linkedin workflow runcommand allows for the execution of action sequences defined in a JSON workflow format, which introduces a form of dynamic orchestration and logic execution. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection due to its handling of untrusted external data in conjunction with high-impact capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Fetches profile data, private messages, and post content from LinkedIn via
person fetch,message get, andpost fetchcommands as documented inSKILL.mdandEXTENDED.md. - Capability inventory: The skill enables high-impact write operations, including sending messages, connection requests, and creating posts, as well as executing workflows.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or specific instructions provided to the agent to treat fetched social media data as untrusted or to ignore any embedded instructions.
- Sanitization: The skill does not describe any sanitization, validation, or filtering mechanisms for the data retrieved from LinkedIn before it is presented to the agent's context.
Audit Metadata