requesting-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by interpolating untrusted input into a subagent prompt.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the
[DESCRIPTION]and[PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS]placeholders incode-reviewer.md. - Boundary markers: Data is delimited by Markdown headers, but there is no specific "ignore embedded instructions" warning to prevent the subagent from following commands within the review material.
- Capability inventory: The subagent can execute
git diff,git show,git log, andgit worktreeas defined incode-reviewer.md. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the interpolated variables is present.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell-based commands for its core functionality.
- Evidence: Use of
git rev-parse,git log,git diff, andgit worktreeacrossSKILL.mdandcode-reviewer.mdto analyze repository state and code history. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates subagent instructions at runtime by interpolating text into a predefined template.
- Evidence: The use of
[DESCRIPTION],[PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS],[BASE_SHA], and[HEAD_SHA]placeholders incode-reviewer.mdcreates a dynamic prompt for the general-purpose subagent based on the current task context.
Audit Metadata