tome
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, untrusted data including git diffs, pull request metadata, and meeting transcripts to generate its documentation and articles.
- Ingestion points: As described in
SKILL.mdandreference/article-handoffs.md, data enters the context via the 'Launch' tool (PR info), 'Trail' tool (git history), and direct user uploads of transcripts or drafts. - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured handoff templates with YAML delimiters and mandates the use of
[Inference: evidence]markers to separate inferred intent from technical facts found in the code. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute git commands (e.g.,
git reflog) and write various documentation files. - Sanitization: The 'Boundaries' section in
SKILL.mdexplicitly forbids including security implementation details (secret keys, auth internals) and requires masking internal project details before public release. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's documentation and reference files mention several command-line tools and shell operations.
- Evidence: References to
git reflog,npx zenn-cli,brew install, andnpx zenn-cli initappear inSKILL.mdandreference/article-platform-optimization.md. - Context: These commands are contextually appropriate for the developer-centric purpose of the skill. The
sudomention inreference/quickstart-guide.mdis part of a troubleshooting template designed for human users to follow, rather than an instruction for the agent to escalate its own privileges.
Audit Metadata