xlsx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The file
scripts/office/soffice.pydynamically generates C source code at runtime, writes it to a temporary location, and compiles it into a shared library usinggcc. It subsequently uses theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to inject this library into the LibreOffice (soffice) process. This mechanism is documented as a workaround to allow LibreOffice to function in restricted environments by intercepting and redirecting Unix socket system calls to use socket pairs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runacross several scripts to execute external system tools. This includes invokinggccto compile technical shims inscripts/office/soffice.py, runningsofficefor model recalculation inscripts/recalc.py, using thefileutility for document format identification inscripts/parse_complex_excel.py, and usinggit difffor redlining validation inscripts/office/validators/redlining.py. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As the skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted Office documents provided by users, it inherently possesses a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. While the skill employs
defusedxmlto protect against XML-based attacks like XXE, the automated extraction and processing of content from complex binary formats like Excel and Word could be used to deliver malicious instructions into the agent's context.
Audit Metadata