git-pushing

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a bash script (scripts/smart_commit.sh) to execute several shell commands: git add ., git commit, git rev-parse, and git push. While these are standard git operations, the use of git add . is aggressive and could lead to the unintentional staging and pushing of sensitive files (like .env or credentials) that are not properly excluded in .gitignore.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill accepts user-provided input for commit messages which are passed as arguments to a shell script. This creates a vulnerability surface where a malicious user could attempt to inject shell metacharacters.
  • Ingestion points: The SKILL.md instructions allow the agent to pass user-specified text as the first argument to smart_commit.sh.
  • Boundary markers: None. There are no delimiters or instructions to treat the message as inert data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local filesystem (git commit) and perform network operations (git push).
  • Sanitization: The script uses double quotes ("$MESSAGE") which prevents word splitting, but it does not perform any validation or filtering of the input string to ensure it contains only expected commit message content.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The SKILL.md file claims the script handles a "Claude footer," yet the provided scripts/smart_commit.sh contains no logic to append such a footer or modify the commit message beyond the basic input. This inconsistency between the description and the actual script implementation can be misleading.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 29, 2026, 03:41 PM