cti-domain-research
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on an external 'NotebookLM connector plugin' that is not bundled with the skill. Users are instructed to download this plugin from a GitHub repository, run
npm install, and the agent is then instructed to execute it usingnode. Specifically, thecti-search.mdslash command executesnode ~/.claude/plugins/notebooklm-connector/index.jswith parameters derived from search results. - Evidence:
SKILL.md(NotebookLM Integration section) andcti-search.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's installation process and various README files encourage the user to clone external repositories from GitHub to enable additional functionality. One repository belongs to the skill's author (
Security-Phoenix-demo), while others use placeholders likeYOUR_USERNAME. - Evidence:
README.mdand theReadmebuild notes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to perform several operations, including installing itself, checking for plugin presence, and calling the Node.js connector script. The command line constructed for the NotebookLM push includes subshells and environment variables which, while quoted, bridge data from external search results to a local shell execution. - Evidence:
install.shandcti-search.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes content from over 300 curated external security domains to generate summaries, IOC extracts, and TTP mappings. This creates a significant ingestion surface for malicious instructions embedded in web content.
- Ingestion points: Web search results from domains listed in
cti-domains.txt(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill instructions do not specify delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the search results.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses
BashandWebSearchcapabilities, and routinely passes search result URLs to a shell-executed script (cti-search.md). - Sanitization: Absent; there is no explicit instruction to sanitize or validate the content retrieved from external domains before it is processed by the agent.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The
install.shscript installs a custom slash command and reference data into the~/.claude/directory. This modifies the agent's environment to persist the skill's functionality across sessions. - Evidence:
install.shcopying files to$HOME/.claude/commands.
Audit Metadata