phoenix-final-gate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests specification data from several preceding roles (01–09) to make final decisions. This ingestion of untrusted data from previous automated or user-influenced steps creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: Output files and context from Roles 01 through 09.\n
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present.\n
- Capability inventory: Writing files to the local file system and interacting with external services via Atlassian (Confluence), Slack, Linear, and Asana.\n
- Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or filtering logic for the ingested specifications before processing them.
Audit Metadata