AsnRecon
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow
workflows/FullAsnRecon.mdcontains a shell command that directly interpolates the user-provided{company_name}:curl -s "https://bgp.he.net/search?search[search]={company_name}" | grep -oP 'AS\d+' | sort -u. A malicious user could provide a company name value containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,"; rm -rf /; #) to execute arbitrary commands on the system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches and processes data from an external source, which could allow for indirect prompt injection if that source were to return malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Data is retrieved from
bgp.he.netvia search and prefix table fetches as defined inworkflows/FindAsn.md,workflows/FindIpRanges.md, andworkflows/FullAsnRecon.md. - Boundary markers: The prompts lack boundary markers or explicit instructions to treat the external content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands and write files to the local file system.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the external content before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches network and routing data from
bgp.he.net, a well-known service for BGP reconnaissance and IPv4 prefix lookups.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata