docx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a hardcoded C source string that is written to a temporary file and compiled at runtime usinggcc. The resulting shared library (lo_socket_shim.so) is used as a technical shim for LibreOffice. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/accept_changes.pygenerates a StarBasic macro (ACCEPT_CHANGES_MACRO) and writes it to a temporary LibreOffice user profile. This macro is then executed via thesofficecommand to programmatically accept all tracked changes in a document. - [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES_AND_REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
LD_PRELOADto inject the dynamically compiled C shim into thesofficeprocess. This technique shims low-level socket functions (socket,listen,accept) to bypass environmental restrictions on AF_UNIX sockets. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted Word documents provided by users. This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions could be embedded in the document XML.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/office/unpack.pyandscripts/office/validate.py(via zip extraction and XML parsing). - Boundary markers: XML structure and pretty-printing; however, the agent is instructed to edit raw XML directly.
- Capability inventory: Extensive use of
subprocess.runto callsoffice,gcc,git,pandoc, andpdftoppmacross multiple script files. - Sanitization: The skill uses
defusedxmlfor XML parsing in all major processing scripts, which mitigates standard XML-based attacks like XXE.
Audit Metadata