pptx
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Runtime compilation and dynamic library injection. The script
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a hardcoded C source string that is written to a temporary location and compiled into a shared library usinggcc. This library is then loaded into thesofficeprocess memory using theLD_PRELOADenvironment variable to intercept and modify system call behavior for socket handling. While this serves a utility purpose in restricted environments, it employs techniques common in advanced exploitation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Extensive use of shell commands for file processing. Multiple scripts utilize
subprocess.runto execute external tools includingsoffice(document conversion),pdftoppm(image rendering),git(difference analysis), andgcc(compilation). These operations rely on the presence and integrity of system binaries. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Instructions for installing third-party dependencies from public registries. The skill documentation recommends the installation of several Python packages (
markitdown,Pillow) and global Node.js packages (pptxgenjs,react-icons,sharp,react,react-dom) from public package registries at setup time. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection from untrusted document content. The skill ingests, parses, and presents the content of user-provided
.pptxfiles to the AI agent for analysis and visual inspection. Malicious text or metadata within these files could attempt to influence or override agent instructions during processing. Additionally, whiledefusedxmlis used in most parsing routines, some scripts likescripts/office/validators/redlining.pyutilize the standardxml.etree.ElementTreemodule which lacks built-in protections against XML External Entity (XXE) attacks.
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