setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses an unsafe interpolation pattern where user-supplied arguments are placed directly after a 'Task:' label at the end of the instructions. This can lead to the agent interpreting user input as direct commands to override behavior.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of secondary setup and diagnostic tools (
omc-setup,omc-doctor,mcp-setup). While the specific commands are not in this file, setup utilities traditionally require high-privilege shell access and file system modifications. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface:
- Ingestion points: User-provided input is captured via
{{ARGUMENTS}},{{ARGUMENTS_AFTER_DOCTOR}}, and{{ARGUMENTS_AFTER_MCP}}inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The arguments are interpolated directly into the prompt text without XML tags, triple quotes, or other delimiters to isolate untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill routes to
omc-setup,omc-doctor, andmcp-setup(referenced inSKILL.md), which are intended for system configuration and diagnostics. - Sanitization: Absent. There are no instructions for the agent to validate, escape, or ignore embedded instructions within the user-provided arguments.
Audit Metadata