skill-comply
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/runner.pyexecutes shell commands defined inscenario.setup_commandsusingsubprocess.run. These commands are dynamically generated by an LLM based on the content of the skill file being analyzed, which could lead to arbitrary command execution if a malicious input file manipulates the generation process. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple scripts including
scripts/classifier.py,scripts/runner.py,scripts/scenario_generator.py, andscripts/spec_generator.pyusesubprocess.runto invoke theclaudeCLI tool for processing prompts and running scenarios. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The tool is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests untrusted data (skill/rule files) at
scripts/run.py, generates prompts from this data inscripts/scenario_generator.py, and executes them inscripts/runner.py. A malicious skill file could contain instructions designed to hijack the behavior of the evaluation agent during the scenario run. Although the runner uses sandbox directories and limits allowed tools toRead, Write, Edit, Bash, Glob, Grep, these capabilities are still significant. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]:
scripts/runner.pyexecutesgit initand other setup commands within a temporary sandbox directory located at/tmp/skill-comply-sandbox. While path traversal protections are implemented, the execution of generated setup commands remains a risk factor.
Audit Metadata