skills/sehoon787/my-claude/team/Gen Agent Trust Hub

team

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture presents an indirect prompt injection surface because user-provided task descriptions are decomposed and passed to subagents without comprehensive sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: The task parameter provided by the user in the /team command (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The worker preamble uses structured section headers (e.g., == WORK PROTOCOL ==), but the specific subtask instructions are interpolated without unique delimiters (e.g., XML tags or security-hardened separators) to isolate them from worker instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Worker agents possess significant capabilities including Read, Write, Edit, and Bash tools. CLI workers (codex, gemini) have broad filesystem access (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No explicit validation, escaping, or sanitization of the user-provided task description is documented before interpolation into agent prompts.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references optional functionality that requires the installation of @openai/codex and @google/gemini-cli from the NPM registry. These packages are provided by well-known technology organizations and facilitate the skill's CLI worker features.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 24, 2026, 07:44 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — team