team
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture presents an indirect prompt injection surface because user-provided task descriptions are decomposed and passed to subagents without comprehensive sanitization.
- Ingestion points: The
taskparameter provided by the user in the/teamcommand (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The worker preamble uses structured section headers (e.g.,
== WORK PROTOCOL ==), but the specific subtask instructions are interpolated without unique delimiters (e.g., XML tags or security-hardened separators) to isolate them from worker instructions. - Capability inventory: Worker agents possess significant capabilities including
Read,Write,Edit, andBashtools. CLI workers (codex,gemini) have broad filesystem access (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No explicit validation, escaping, or sanitization of the user-provided
taskdescription is documented before interpolation into agent prompts. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references optional functionality that requires the installation of
@openai/codexand@google/gemini-clifrom the NPM registry. These packages are provided by well-known technology organizations and facilitate the skill's CLI worker features.
Audit Metadata